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manage the transmitted digital content. To alleviate these problems, hardware-based
search (FPgrep) and search-and-replace (FPsed) modules have been developed. FP-
grep has the ability to scan packet payloads for a given set of regular expressions
and pass or drop packets based on the payload contents. FPsed also scans packet
payloads for a set of regular expressions and adds the ability to modify the payload
if desired. The hardware circuits that implement the FPgrep and FPsed modules
can be generated, compiled, and synthesized using a simple web interface. Once a
module is created it is programmed into logic on a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA). The FPgrep and FPsed modules use FPGAs to process packets at the full
rate of Gigabit-speed networks. Both modules, along with several supporting applica-
tions were developed and tested using the Field Programmable Port Extender (FPX)
platform. Applications developed for the modules currently include a spam filter,
virus protection, an information security filter, as well as a copyright enforcement
function.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With the ever-increasing popularity of the Internet, it is becoming increasingly more
difficult to manage digital content and to ensure the safety of machines connected to a
network. On a daily basis, email accounts are flooded with spam, network machines
are infected with viruses, servers are crashed by Denial of Service (DOS) attacks,
company secrets are leaked, and millions of files are traded illegally. The Internet has
truly become a dangerous place from both a user perspective as well as a corporate
perspective.
Firewalls and Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) attempt to protect
networks from the perils of the Internet. They provide protection for Local Area
Networks (LANs) by enforcing Access Control Policies (ACPs) for both incoming
and outgoing traffic and by alerting a system administrator if any of these policies
are broken. Currently, the scope of most ACPs only covers packet headers. Some
firewalls and NIDS also support ACPs that do exact string matching within the packet
payload. However, this is usually done in software making it too slow and inefficient
2for modern network backbones. Current firewalls and NIDS also do nothing to protect
against the widespread distribution of illegal digital content.
By giving firewalls and NIDS the ability to perform regular expression (RE)
matching in hardware, instead of software, the power of these systems can be greatly
enhanced. With regular expressions, a single ACP is capable of enforcing rules which
previously took multiple ACPs to enforce (just as one IP address/netmask pair can
be used to specify multiple IP addresses). More importantly, regular expressions can
give ACPs the ability to enforce rules on mutable content such as that found in many
Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks and viruses. By doing all of the RE processing in
hardware, every byte of every packet can be scanned while still maintaining the speed
and throughput required for very high speed network backbones.
This thesis describes the implementation of hardware-based search (FPgrep)
and search-and-replace (FPsed) modules that can be used to augment the capabili-
ties of modern firewalls and NIDS. To achieve the performance required by today’s
high-performance networks, hardware devices known as Field Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGAs) are employed. FPGAs offer a method for implementing functions in
hardware using reprogrammable chips. In addition, FPgrep and FPsed utilize regular
expressions to provide a powerful method for specifying a single string pattern or set
of string patterns that may be searched for within the payload of a packet as it passes
through a network. The regular expressions can range in complexity from a simple
single character string to a string consisting of multiple wildcards.
By combining the power of regular expressions and the flexibility of FPGAs
on the Field Programmable Port Extender (FPX) [14, 15], the FPgrep and FPsed
packet payload processors may be used to process packet contents within a Local
Area Network or even over the Internet.
31.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis begins with a brief history on the methods used for string matching,
and string matching in hardware. This is followed by a description of the Field
Programmable Port Extender platform and a set of layered Protocol Wrappers used
for the hardware modules. Next is a description and results for both the FPgrep and
FPsed hardware modules. After describing the modules, there is a description on how
they can be automatically generated and programmed into the FPX platform. Finally,
different applications for the technology are discussed and how each is implemented.
4Chapter 2
String Matching
2.1 Background on String Matching
Both string matching and regular expression matching have been studied extensively
in the past. Prior to the late 1970’s, string searching was accomplished using a
brute force method. The brute force method assumes that a pattern of length m
may occur at any position in a string of length n, and then sets about testing each
possible orientation. The brute force method’s worst case running time is O(nm).
The major problem with the brute force search is that characters in the text may
be re-examined multiple times. In some cases, this can lead to poor performance.
In 1977 both Knuth, Morris and Pratt (KMP) [13], and Boyer and Moore (BM) [2]
developed efficient approaches to string searching. The KMP algorithm provides a
way to eliminate repeated accesses to the text and delivers a guaranteed linear time
searching algorithm. By using previous character information, the KMP algorithm
can access the characters sequentially without any need to back up and re-read por-
tions of the input. The BM algorithm uses an approach similar to that of the KMP
algorithm, but instead searches text from right-to-left. This eliminates the need for
5the algorithm to examine a great deal of the text on a mismatch. Both the KMP and
the BM algorithms have a worst case running time of O(n+m).
Thompson [29] developed the classical approach for searching for a regular
expression. Thompson’s idea involves converting a regular expression into a Non-
deterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) with O(m) nodes. The worst case running
time of the search is O(nm) because the machine may be in more than one state at
any given time. Consequently, there may be situations in which all states require a
transition to a new state resulting in a slow and inefficient method of searching. A
more efficient technique (in terms of running time) is to convert the NFA into a De-
terministic Finite Automaton (DFA). This approach yields a worst case running time
of O(n). A drawback to this approach is that, theoretically, there can be up to O(2m)
states, thereby requiring a great deal of memory or hardware for implementation.
2.1.1 Regular Expressions
A regular expression is a pattern that describes a set of strings. The basic build-
ing blocks for these patterns consist of individual characters that match themselves
such as “a”, “b”, and “c”. Combining characters with meta-characters (∗, |, ?) allows
more complex regular expressions to be created. If r1 and r2 are regular expressions
then r1∗ matches any string composed of zero or more occurrences of r1; r1? matches
any string composed of zero or one occurrences of r1; r1|r2 matches any string com-
posed of r1 or r2; and r1r2 matches any string composed of r1 concatenated with
r2. For instance, “a” is a regular expression that denotes the singleton set {“a”},
while “a|b” denotes the set {“a”,“b”}. The expression “a* ” denotes the infinite set
{“”,“a”,“aa”,“aaa”,. . .}.
6Regular Expression Terminology
Before beginning a more in-depth discussion, some of the terminology used in this
thesis to describe the matching of regular expressions is defined below.
Start: The transition of a state machine from the idle (initial) state to
a non-idle state.
Accept: The state machine has accepted the substring if the state ma-
chine has determined that the substring is a member of the language
defined by the RE. For instance, if the regular expression that is being
searched for is “abc?”, then the language defined by this expression is the
set {“ab”, “abc”}. For this language the state machine will accept when it
detects the substring “ab”. This substring is a member of the set defined
by the regular expression. However, the state machine cannot be sure that
this is the longest possible match until it sees the next character. If the
next character in the substring is “c”, then the state machine will now
accept the substring “abc” as part of the language. If the next character
in the substring is not “c”, then the state machine will continue to accept
the substring “ab” as part of the language. Once a state machine accepts
a substring it must match on that substring some time in the future.
Match: The state machine has determined the boundaries of the com-
plete substring. Using the example above, the state machine would match
on the third character independent of what the character is. If the third
character is a “c”, then the substring “abc”matches. If the third character
is something other than “c”, then the substring “ab” matches.
7Running: The state machine has started but not yet failed. The state
machine may or may not be in an accepting state.
Reset/Fail: The state machine was running and a character read caused
the substring to no longer be a member of the language defined by the
RE. If the substring was previously accepted then a match was created
over a portion of the substring up to, but not including the character that
caused the state machine to reset.
Idle: The state machine is not running. A character has not yet been
read that defines the beginning of the language that is being searched for.
2.2 String Matching in Hardware
The idea of string matching in hardware is a topic that has been explored for over two
decades. Haskin and Hollar [8] offer a comprehensive (but dated) survey on hardware-
based regular expression matchers. The authors discuss various techniques and offer a
novel solution of their own. They defined three different classes of approaches: parallel
comparators, cellular comparators, and finite state machines. Both the parallel and
cellular comparator techniques have substantial drawbacks. The parallel technique
can only handle a fixed number of terms of a fixed maximum size. The cellular
technique can require extensive logic to implement. The last technique, the use
of a finite state machine, is capable of handling exact character and character class
matching. Haskin discusses a technique of simulating an NFA by replicating a number
of DFAs where an idle DFA starts every time the possible beginning of a term is
recognized.
8More recent work in the area of string matching on FPGAs has been done
by Sidhu and Prasanna [22] as well as by Franklin, Carver, and Hutchings [7]. The
work by Sidhu and Prasanna was primarily concerned with minimizing the time and
space required to construct NFAs because they run their NFA construction algorithm
in hardware as opposed to software. Their work yielded an exceptional approach
to string matching in hardware. Franklin, Carver, and Hutchings followed with an
analysis of this approach for the large set of expressions found in a Snort database
[18].
2.2.1 Nondeterministic vs Deterministic Finite Automata
In other work, NFAs were chosen due to the shorter time and smaller space required
for constructing the automata [22]. In contrast, this work was not concerned with the
time and space required for constructing the automata. It was however, concerned
with the size of the completed automata. Theoretically, DFAs can contain up to
O(2n) states, where n is the number of characters in the expression. However, in
practice it was found that the number of states required is most often less than or
equal to n. In addition to this, DFAs can only have one active state and thus can be
represented more compactly than NFAs if the state of the search needs to be stored.
To verify that DFAs are generally more compact with real data, spam-matching
rules were extracted from the current version (2.60) of the SpamAssassin [23] program.
State machines were then generated from the 358 regular expressions found in this
database using a Java-based lexical analyzer generator called JLex [1]. As input, JLex
takes a regular expression. It outputs a Java file that contains state and transition
tables for a minimized DFA that implements the given expression. The JLex tool was
run to generate an NFA and a minimal DFA from each of the regular expressions. It
9was found that most of the expressions created DFAs that were optimized to contain
fewer states than the NFA. Figure 2.1 shows the ratio of the number of states in the
JLex-optimized DFA to the number of states in the NFA. Note that where the x-axis
equals 1 is the point where the DFA and the NFA are equal in size. To the left of
this point represents DFAs that are smaller than the corresponding NFAs and to the
right represents DFAs that are larger.
66% 33%
Figure 2.1: The ratio of the size of the DFA to the NFA for all REs used by the
SpamAssassin program. Note that the majority of the DFAs optimize to be smaller
than the NFAs
Through this experiment it was found that about two-thirds, or 66% of the DFAs
were smaller than the NFAs. Only 2.5% of the expressions had more than a 10x
expansion and only 0.5% went beyond 40x.
A typical SpamAssassin expression used in this experiment is:
U\.?S\.?(D\.?)?[\ ]*(\$[\ ]*)?([0-9]+,[0-9]+,[0-9]+
|[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+|[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+)?[\ ]*milli?on)
The output of JLex for this particular expression is:
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Processing first section -- user code.
Processing second section -- JLex declarations.
Processing third section -- lexical rules.
Creating NFA machine representation.
NFA comprised of 78 states.
Working on character classes.:
::.:.::.::............:::..:::
NFA has 15 distinct character classes.
Creating DFA transition table.
Working on DFA states.............................
Minimizing DFA transition table.
24 states after removal of redundant states.
Outputting lexical analyzer code.
From the above output, it can be seen that the NFA for this expression contains 78
distinct states whereas the DFA only contains 24. This represents a DFA to NFA
ratio of .3 to 1 [16].
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Chapter 3
The Field Programmable Port
Extender and Protocol Wrappers
3.1 Field Programmable Port Extender (FPX)
The FPX is a reprogrammable logic device that provides a hardware platform for
the user to deploy packet processing network modules [14, 15]. It can act as an
interface between the line cards and the WUGS (Washington University Gigabit
Switch) [5] as shown in Figure 3.1. It can also be used in a stand-alone configuration.
The FPX is composed of two FPGAs: the Network Interface Device (NID) and the
Reprogrammable Application Device (RAD) [27].
3.1.1 Network Interface Device (NID)
The NID controls how packet flows are routed to and from hardware modules pro-
grammed into the RAD. It also provides mechanisms to dynamically load hardware
modules over the network. The combination of these features allows these modules
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to be dynamically loaded and unloaded without affecting the switching of other traf-
fic flows or the processing of packets by other modules in the system. As show in
Figure 3.2, the NID has several components, all of which are implemented in FPGA
hardware. It contains a four-port switch to transfer data between ports; Virtual Cir-
cuit lookup tables (VC) on each port in order to selectively route flows; a Control
Cell Processor (CCP), which is used to process control cells that are transmitted and
received over the network; logic to reprogram the FPGA hardware on the RAD; and
synchronous and asynchronous interfaces to the four network ports that surround the
NID.
IPP
IPP
OPP
OPP
IPP
IPP OPP
OPP
Card
OC3/
OC12/
OC48
Line FPX
Extender
Port
programmable
Field−
FPX
Extender
Port
Field−
programmable
Card
OC3/
OC12/
OC48
Line
Switch
Fabric
Gigabit
Figure 3.1: Configuration for the WUGS, FPX, and the line cards
3.1.2 FPX Reprogramability
The RAD can be programmed and reprogrammed to hold user-defined network mod-
ules [24], and is connected to two SRAM and two SDRAM components (Figure 3.2).
In order to reprogram the RAD over the network, the NID implements a reliable
protocol that fills the contents of the on-board RAM with configuration data that are
transmitted over the network. As each cell arrives, the NID uses the data and the
sequence number in the cell to write data into the RAD Program SRAM. Once the
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Figure 3.2: Major components of the FPX
last cell has been correctly received, the FPX holds an image of the reconfiguration
bitstream that is needed to reprogram the RAD. At that time, another control cell
can be sent to the NID to initiate the reprogramming of the RAD using the contents
of the RAD Program SRAM.
The FPX supports partial reprogramming of the RAD by allowing configura-
tion streams to contain commands that only program a portion of the logic on the
RAD [9, 10]. Rather than issue a command to reinitialize the device, the NID writes
the frames of reconfiguration data to the RAD’s reprogramming port. This feature
enables the other modules on the RAD to continue processing packets during the
partial reconfiguration. Similar techniques have been implemented in other systems
using software-based controllers [30].
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3.2 Protocol Wrappers
Protocol Wrappers [3, 4] are used in the FPgrep and FPsed modules to streamline and
simplify the networking functions to process ATM cells, AAL5 frames and IP packets
directly in hardware. They use a layered design and consist of different processing
circuits within each layer. The block diagram of the Protocol Wrappers is shown in
Figure 3.3. At the lowest level, the Cell Processor processes raw ATM cells between
network interfaces. At the higher levels, the Frame Processor processes variable length
AAL5 frames while the IP Processor processes IP packets. Additionally, there is a
UDP Processor that transmits and receives UDP messages, but this level was not
required for the FPgrep and FPsed modules.
Different layers of abstraction are important for structuring the functions of a
network because doing so allows relevant details to be exposed and irrelevant details
to be hidden. In this manner, an application that interacts with IP packets can
effectively interface just with the IP the Protocol Wrapper.
Data written
to network
IP Processor
Frame Processor
Cell Processor
Data read
from network
FPgrep/
FPsed
Figure 3.3: Block diagram of FPGrep/FPSed module in the Protocol Wrappers
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3.2.1 Required Modifications to the Protocol Wrappers
The original Protocol Wrappers, while feature rich, were lacking in certain features
required to process traffic on a real network. Below is a description of several modi-
fication made to the Protocol Wrappers to and why each was required.
The most important modification to the Protocol Wrappers was the ability
to handle any frame and IP packet size. The original Protocol Wrappers were only
able to handle frames and packets that were of modulus four in byte length. This
shortcoming meant that the Protocol Wrappers were only capable of handling 25%
of real network traffic. The other 75% of the traffic would either be corrupted or just
dropped by the wrappers. To fix this issue, the last two bits of the AAL5 length field,
and the last two bits of the IP length field were used to determine exactly how many
bytes needed to be processed.
Additionally, the original Protocol Wrappers were only capable of processing
IP packets that were encapsulated in a frame with the same byte length. This is
because the IP Processor did not actually check the IP length field when receiving
packets. Instead the IP Processor just assumed that any data that was received
from the Frame Processor was valid IP data. In many cases, this shortcut would
be harmless. However, in the lab it was found that commercial routers often add
additional data to a frame in lieu of padding. This “garbage” data is likely there
to give the AAL5 CRC-32 more robustness. The simple fix to this problem was to
modify the IP Processor to actually check the IP length field and only process the
appropriate amount of data.
Another problem of the original Protocol Wrappers was that all frames at-
tempted to traverse through all layers of the wrappers, and the IP Processor would
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drop any packets that were not IPv4 packets. This means that frames that encap-
sulated ARP packets, DHCP packets, or any other non-IPv4 packet passed from the
Frame Processor to the IP Processor and would be dropped. This behavior was unac-
ceptable because real networks have many different types of packets that are required
for efficient communication. In order to handle this problem, the design of the IP
Processor was modified to bypass non-IPv4 packets around the user application as
opposed to dropping them. This approach required adding an additional buffer to
the output side of the IP Processor.
The next change that was required was to deal with different types of encapsu-
lation methods on networks. The original IP Processor was only capable of processing
packets that were embedded directly into a frame without any additional encapsula-
tion headers, such as an LLC/SNAP or a MAC header. This limited the utility of
the IP Processor on real network traffic because most routers use some type of packet
encapsulation. The solution to this was to add a new control signal to augment the
original three: start-of-frame, start-of-payload, and end-of-frame signals. The new
control signal, start-of-IP-header, allows the IP wrapper to pass headers that arrive
after the start-of-frame signal, but before the IP header itself.
Other changes to the Protocol Wrappers include removing a great deal of
unused logic from the Cell Processor as well as addressing several bugs related to
frame size and dropped frames in the Frame Processor.
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Chapter 4
FPgrep: Packet Payload Scanning
Using Regular Expressions
The FPgrep content scanner is a hardware module that is capable of searching network
packet payloads for a list of regular expressions. The scanner was implemented as
a module on the FPX platform. The scanner utilizes the Protocol Wrappers to
reassemble cells into IP packets and to delineate the header and payload fields. When
designing the content scanner, four initial behaviors were desired: (1) the ability to
scan every byte of every packet’s payload for a given set of expressions, (2) the ability
to actively drop packets that match a given expression, (3) the ability to generate
an alert packet identifying which expressions in the given set match, and (4) the
ability to send an alert packet to a log server when a match is detected. This chapter
describes how the hardware module accomplishes each of these tasks.
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4.1 Searching
FPgrep searches the input for substrings that belong to the language defined by
the regular expression. When FPgrep matches a substring in a packet it has the
ability to transmit information about the packet to a monitoring host system. The
information sent can include the sender’s and receiver’s IP addresses and/or any other
data transmitted over the connection.
The search runs in linear time (proportional to packet size) O(n) and in con-
stant space. That is, there is never a need to examine a character more than once
and the amount of hardware is proportional to the size of the regular expression.
Approximately one flip-flop is required per character.
When a regular expression search is requested, a “.∗” is prepended to the
beginning of the original regular expression. It is natural to think about it this way
since searching involves finding any number of characters followed by a matching
substring. The prepended “.∗” allows the machine to recognize a matching substring
anywhere in the record [12].
If the “.∗” is not prepended, then there are situations in which a substring that
should be matched by the machine is missed. This situation arises if a machine M
enters the running state when it encounters character ci and then transitions to the
failed/reset state when it encounters ci+n. If the machine simply continues reading
beginning with the next character, ci+n+1, it would not detect a substring whose first
character is in the range ci+1 to ci+n.
A small example illustrates this problem. Assume “ARL” is being searched
for. If both “ARL” and “.∗ARL” are converted into DFAs, two functionally different
machines (DFA1 and DFA2 respectively) are produced. These DFAs can be seen in
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
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2 3 4
5 R 4,L A 3
1A R 2
A R L1
Figure 4.1: DFA1 for “ARL” does not reach the accept state
2 3 4
1A R,R 2 4 L 5
A 3
A R L1
A
Figure 4.2: DFA2 for “.
∗ARL” does reach the accept state
When the input to the machines is “A1R2A3R4L5”, DFA1 will recognize that
“A1” followed by “R2” is part of the language. When “A3” is input, the machine
fails and thus transitions to the idle state. It is clear that machine will not find
the substring “A3R4L5”, since when the next character “R4” is input into DFA1 it
remains in the idle state. On the other hand DFA2 does operate correctly and finds
the substring.
4.2 FPgrep Hardware Implementation
The FPgrep hardware module has been implemented to perform a complete payload
scan of every packet that passes through it. The module uses the previously mentioned
technique of prepending a “.∗” to each regular expression to aid in the search. A block
diagram of the implementation can be seen in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Block diagram of FPgrep content-scanning module
4.2.1 Logic Controller
The logic controller performs most of the work. It controls the reading and writing of
the memory buffers, the data that is sent to the regular expression state machines, and
the alert packet generator. The controller has three main operations: (1) Receiving
Packets, (2) Processing Packets, and (3) Outputting Packets. Each of these three
operations is controlled independently of the other two. All three operations run in
parallel.
Receiving Packets
Packets enter the module in 32-bit chunks after passing through the Protocol Wrap-
pers. The Protocol Wrappers assert control signals to indicate the beginning of a
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frame, the beginning of IP packet headers, the beginning of an IP packet payload,
and the end of a frame. There is also a data enable signal to indicate the presence
of a valid 32-bit data word on the incoming bus. Every valid data word, along with
the four control signals, is written to two parallel 512x36 dual-port memory buffers.
By using two identical buffers, it is possible to read newer packets for processing
while older packets (that are not being dropped) are read for output. This could be
achieved with a single tri-port memory buffer if available.
Processing Packets
Once data are available in the input buffer (a packet has started arriving), the module
can begin processing the packet (Figure 4.4). To process a packet with the content
scanner, a counter is used to address one of the 512x36 memory buffers. On each
clock tick, one byte is read from the memory buffer and sent to each of the regular
expression DFAs. All of the DFAs search in parallel. Each DFA maintains a 1-bit
match signal that is asserted high when a match is found within the packet that is
being processed. When the counter reaches the end of the packet, one or more of the
following can occur:
1. If the match signals from all of the DFAs indicate no match was found, then a
pointer to the packet is inserted into an output queue.
2. If any of the match signals indicate a match was found but do not require
dropping the packet, then a pointer to the packet is inserted into an output
queue.
3. If one or more of the match signals indicates a match was found that requires
dropping the packet, then a pointer to the packet is not inserted into an output
queue, hence the packet is dropped.
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4. If one or more of the match signals indicates a match was found that requires
an alert packet to be sent, then a pointer to the original packet is inserted into
an output queue. This enables the alert packet to use header information from
the original packet. Also, a special pointer is inserted into a match queue to
indicates an alert packet should be output. The special pointer contains a bit
array that indicates which DFAs found a match. It should be noted that if a
match is found that requires an alert packet but does not require dropping the
packet, two pointers (one for the original packet and one for the alert packet)
are inserted into the output queue.
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Figure 4.4: FPgrep flow diagram for the input/searching process
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Outputting Packets
A packet is output from the content scanner whenever there is an available pointer
in the output queue. Each pointer that is dequeued can be either for a regular packet
or for an alert packet. This is determined by dequeuing a pointer from the match
queue. If the pointer from the match queue is all zeros, or null, then a regular packet
should be output. If the pointer from the match queue is not null, then an alert
packet should be output.
In the case of a regular packet, a counter is assigned the value of the pointer
and used to address the 512x36 output memory. The packet is then output 32-bits per
clock cycle until the end of the packet is detected. The most significant 4 bits of the
output memory are used to recreate the necessary control signals for communicating
with the Protocol Wrappers.
When an alert packet pointer is dequeued, a UDP alert packet has to be
generated since one does not already exist. The alert packet can be addressed to a
predetermined log server (specified at compile time but also runtime reconfigurable) or
to the destination of the original packet that caused the alert packet to be generated.
The payload of the alert packet contains the source and destination IP address of the
packet that caused the alert, an associated identification number for all of the regular
expressions that matched in the original packet, along with several other fields. More
details on the format of the alert packet can be seen section A.1 in Appendix A.
4.3 Increasing Throughput via Parallel Scanners
As mentioned in the sections Receiving Packets and Processing Packets, packets enter
the content scanner at a rate of 32-bits per clock cycle, and are processed at 8-bits per
clock cycle. As a result, the content scanner can only process data at one-quarter of
24
the maximum input rate. In order to process data at the full input rate, four parallel
content scanners are arranged as shown in Figure 4.5. Arriving packets are dispatched
to an available content scanner in a round-robin fashion. With four parallel scanners,
the module is now capable of scanning 32-bits per clock cycle.
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Figure 4.5: Arrangement of four parallel FPgrep scanners
4.4 Results
Several different versions of the content scanner were synthesized with the Proto-
col Wrappers into the RAD of the FPX. The regular expression set for each of the
content scanners consisted of 21 regular expressions. The expressions chosen were
aimed primarily at dropping spam. For example, “Get Rich Quick” and “(L|l)imited
(T|t)ime (O|o)ffer” were among the expressions in the set. On average, each regular
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expression was 20 characters long. Note that these were simpler expressions than
those found in the SpamAssassin database.
Each of the scanners was tested in the lab using NCHARGE [24] for initial
testing. NCHARGE allowed single packets to be sent to the content scanner for
easier debugging. Later stages of testing were conducted using real Internet traffic
via web browsers, email clients, and FTP clients. The configuration of the lab setup
is shown in Figure 4.6. This type of testing allowed placement of pseudo-viruses
and other content on the Internet to verify detection and potential dropping by the
scanning module.
The following subsections describe the device utilization and throughput of the
content scanner modules on a Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-6 part.
Figure 4.6: Laboratory test layout
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4.4.1 Device Utilization
Device utilization for three different modules is shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Table 4.1 shows the device utilization for a module containing only the Protocol
Wrappers. These values represent the overhead of the packet processing done by
the Protocol Wrappers. Table 4.2 details the device utilization for a single content
scanner that implements the spam filter with the Protocol Wrappers. Table 4.3 shows
the device utilization for the four parallel content scanners shown in Figure 4.5 with
the Protocol Wrappers. The chart in Figure 4.7 helps to illustrate the relative sizes
of each of the modules.
Table 4.1: Device Utilization for Protocol Wrappers
Virtex XCV2000E Utilization
Resources Device Utilization Percentage
Logic Slices 2410 out of 19200 12%
Flip Flops 2870 out of 38400 7%
Block RAMs 19 out of 160 11%
External IOBs 142 out of 512 27%
Table 4.2: Device Utilization for FPgrep Module with Single Content Scanner
Virtex XCV2000E Utilization
Resources Device Utilization Percentage
Logic Slices 3615 out of 19200 18%
Flip Flops 3981 out of 38400 10%
Block RAMs 33 out of 160 20%
External IOBs 142 out of 512 27%
Table 4.3: Device Utilization for FPgrep Module with Quad Content Scanners
Virtex XCV2000E Utilization
Resources Device Utilization Percentage
Logic Slices 6508 out of 19200 33%
Flip Flops 6182 out of 38400 16%
Block RAMs 66 out of 160 41%
External IOBs 142 out of 512 27%
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Figure 4.7: FPgrep device utilization
As mentioned earlier, simplified DFAs use an average of n states for an n
length regular expression. This translated into the hardware as using on average 1
flip-flop per character (minus the overhead associated with the Protocol Wrappers
and the logic controller). Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between the number of
characters in the search string and the number of slices required to implement the
FPgrep hardware module.
4.4.2 Throughput
The single-scanner spam filtering module with 21 regular expressions currently places
and routes at 37 MHz. The critical path of the module was found to be the fanout of
the 8-bit lines to each of the DFAs. The quad-scanner module has similar results; it
also places and routes at 37 MHz. Given that each scanner is capable of processing
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Figure 4.8: Speed and slice utilization as a function of the number of characters in
the search string
8-bits of data per cycle, the throughput of the single-scanner spam filter can be
calculated as 37 MHz × 8 bits = 296 Mbps. By running four content scanners in
parallel, the module can reach 37 MHz × 8 bits × 4 = 1.184 Gbps.
When limiting the scanner to only several small DFAs (thus minimizing the
fanout bottleneck), the module is capable of achieving frequencies in the range of
70-80 MHz. At these frequencies, the module is capable of exceeding 2.5 Gbps. The
graph in Figure 4.8 displays the relationship between the number of characters in the
search string and the speed of the FPGA.
29
Chapter 5
FPsed: Packet Payload
Search-and-Replace Using Regular
Expressions
The streaming content editor, FPsed, was implemented as a module on the FPX
platform. The content editor has the ability to perform regular expression searches
and replacements on network packets passing through the module. The function is
similar to the substitute command of Unix’s stream editor utility (sed). The scanner
utilizes the Protocol Wrappers to process IP packets and delineate the header and
payload fields in hardware
5.1 Search-and-Replace
The FPsed module performs both replacement and global replacement operations
on packet payloads. The task of string replacement of a regular expression is not as
straightforward or efficient as searching. String replacement requires that the machine
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do more than simply determine the presence of matching substrings in a record. The
machine must also determine the position of the first and last character of all complete
substrings that are matched by the machine. It is this requirement that causes the
task of regular expression search-and-replace to be more complicated and less efficient
than a simple search.
Searching for the complete substring is logical when the goal is to replace that
substring. Consider the task of replacing every occurrence of a certain hexadecimal
string associated with a computer virus “37F43(B+|7*)” with the text “Virus Pat-
tern Detected”. For the input string “3172F34435B6B7B8”, the substring could be
replaced from the point where the machine starts running, “31”, to the point where
the substring is accepted “B6”. But this would allow a portion of the virus to remain
in the content stream. In most situations, it is preferable to replace only complete
substrings.
To search for complete substrings, a “.* ” can no longer be prepended to a
regular expression before it is converted to an FSM. This is because prepending a
“.* ” would make it difficult to determine the first character of the matched substring.
It is not believed that there is a general, easily automatable, method for determining
the position of the first character in a matching substring when a “.* ” is prepended.
For instance, suppose all occurrences of “ARL” were to be replaced. Figure 5.1 is a
state machine for the regular expression after prepending a “.* ”.
A
1 2 3 4
A R L
A
Figure 5.1: DFA for “.*ARL”
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If the string “A1A2A3A4R5L6X7” is input to the machine it would begin running
when it encounters “A1” and matches when “X7” is read. This would have the effect
of replacing “A1A2A3A4R5L6” when the intention is to replace “A4R5L6”. One could
counter that this would not be a problem if the machine simply kept a count of
how many characters were read after entering state 2, resetting the count every time
it entered state 2. For this particular example that would be true, but there are
examples that do not have such a simple and formulaic solution.
A slightly more complicated example is “.*AR*L”, seen in Figure 5.2. Once
again there is a solution to the problem, but this time it is more complicated. In this
situation, the machine would again have to keep track of the number of characters
read after entering state 2. However, this time the machine should only reset its count
if the input causing the transition to state 2 is not an “R”.
A
1 2 3 4
A
A
R
A L
Figure 5.2: DFA for “.*AR*L”
An even more complicated example is the machine for “.*A(AR)*L” in Fig-
ure 5.3. It is left to the reader to see that the machine becomes quite complex.
It is therefore difficult to devise a general method for determining the start of
the string. One can always find a more complicated regular expression that would
require the addition of more rules to the method.
It has been shown that prepending a “.* ” to regular expressions that are to
be replaced is clearly not a viable solution as it was with searching. In Chapter 4 on
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Figure 5.3: DFA for “.*A(AR)*L”
FPgrep, it was shown that if a “.* ” is not prepended, the searching functionality will
not have the correct semantics if each character is read only once. Because of this,
FPsed must employ a different technique for dealing with the problem of finding all
complete substrings that match a particular regular expression. A solution to this
problem is to use a brute force (or backtracking) method of searching.
5.1.1 Brute Force
The brute force technique of string searching is a simple and well studied technique.
The idea behind this method is that the machine checks all characters of the input
to determine if they could be the beginning of a substring that matches the regular
expression.
The brute force technique works like this: The machine attempts to read the
input string through the automaton beginning with character ci. If, while processing
the string, the machine fails, it immediately initiates a new search beginning with
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character ci+1. This ensures that all characters are checked to determine if they would
cause the machine to begin running.
As an example, assume the machine is searching for “ABC” and the input is
“A1B2A3B4C5D6”. In this case the machine would begin running on “A1”, continue
to run on “B2” and fail on “A3”. The machine would then backtrack and begin
reading the input from character “B2”. It then begins running when it encounters
“A3”, accepts the substring on “C5” and matches the substring when it reaches “D6”.
The worst case running time occurs when every input character is a possible
starting position, and all but the last character of the input matches the regular
expression. For example, if the machine is searching for “A*B” and the input is
“A0A1 . . . An−1”. The machine must make O(nm) comparisons, where n is the string
length and m is the pattern length, to determine that the pattern does not occur in
the record.
The worst case condition is unlikely to appear when searching for English
language expressions, but it is less rare when searching binary text. Davies and
Bowsher [6] examined the efficiency of the backtracking technique when searching
strings from the English language and binary strings. Their experiments involved
keeping track of the number of references to an input string divided by the number of
characters occurring before the matched substring (the index position of the pattern
minus one) thus obtaining the number of inspected characters in the text string
per character passed. The results of their experiments showed that when searching
English text, the backtracking method referenced the text string 1 to 1.1 times per
character passed. When searching binary text for an expression of length six or
greater, approximately 2 characters were inspected for every character passed.
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5.2 FPsed Hardware Implementation
The FPsed hardware module has been implemented to perform a brute force method
for search-and-replace. The hardware consists of several components, all of which are
controlled by the logic controller. A block diagram for the module can be seen in
Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Block diagram of FPsed search-and-replace module
5.2.1 Logic Controller
The logic controller is the most complex entity in the design. It controls parallel dual-
ported memory buffers, the regular expression machine, the replacement buffer and
the word builder using control signals that it generates. Like the FPgrep controller,
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the FPsed logic controller has three main phases that operate in parallel: (1) Receiving
Packets, (2) Processing Packets, and (3) Outputting Packets.
Receiving Packets
As packets come into the module from the Protocol Wrappers, they are first written
into the two parallel 512x36 dual-port memory buffers. The lower 32 bits written into
the memory buffers are the incoming data. The upper four bits are used to store the
four control signals from the Protocol Wrappers (start of frame, start of IP headers,
start of IP payload, and end of frame). The write-side address lines are shared by
the two memory buffers, as is the write-enable signal. This ensures that the contents
of the two buffers are identical. The address lines are controlled by a simple counter.
Each time a new word is written to memory, the counter is incremented to address
the next location. Finally, because the buffer size is limited, when the buffer is almost
full a congestion signal is sent upstream to notify the Protocol Wrappers and the NID
to stop sending cells. Once the hardware has had a chance to catch up and complete
processing of the received cells, the congestion signal is removed.
Process Characters In Regular Expression Machine
The bytes that are input to the regular expression machine come from the read side
of one of the dual-port memories. Only the payload data are sent through the regular
expression machine for processing. To address the memory, a counter is used to step
through the memory one byte at a time. The bytes are sent to the regular expression
machine and processed. Control signals from the regular expression machine tell the
controller which address to read next using the following rules:
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Figure 5.5: FPsed flow diagram for the input/searching process
1. If no control signals are returning from the regular expression machine (i.e. not
running), the controller updates the current back ptr and increments the byte
address by one.
2. If while running the controller receives an accepting signal from the regular
expression machine, it stores the address of the byte that created the match
into accept ptr and continues to increment the byte address by one.
3. If the controller receives a resetting signal from the regular expression machine,
one of two things can happen:
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(a) If while running, the controller did not receive an accepting signal, it backs
up the byte address and begins processing data immediately proceeding
the byte that previously started the machine.
(b) If an accepting signal was received (a match was found), it backs up the
byte address and begins processing data immediately proceeding the byte
that caused the machine to match. Also, to remember where the match
has occurred, the starting byte address and the ending byte address of the
string are stored in two fifos (the start fifo and the end fifo).
When the end of a packet is reached, the controller sends a reset signal to the
regular expression machine to reset it. A flow diagram of the above process can be
seen in Figure 5.5.
Output Modified Packet
The output process (Figure 5.6) examines bytes from the read port of the second
dual-port memory. It can only output data that are completely done being processed
by the regular expression machine (none of the regular expression machine pointers
reference the data). As the output process steps through the available bytes, it checks
the previously mentioned start fifo and does the following:
1. If the current output address is not stored in the start fifo, then the byte is sent
to the word builder and the byte address is incremented by one.
2. If the current output address is stored in the start fifo, then the following occurs:
(a) The byte is not sent to the word builder. Instead a signal is sent to the
replacement buffer to begin outputting a replacement.
38
(b) The byte address for the output process is assigned the value stored in the
end fifo.
(c) The output process waits for a done signal from the replacement buffer
before processing additional bytes.
Finally, as data are read from the memory and output, the four control bits
are used to assert the appropriate signals back to the Protocol Wrappers.
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Figure 5.6: FPsed flow diagram for output/replacement process
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5.2.2 Replacement Buffer
The replacement buffer contains a variable length array of byte strings. This array
contains the replacement string, which determines the length of the array. The re-
placement buffer has two states: idle and replace. By default the buffer is in the
idle state until it receives a signal from the controller to begin a replacement. At
this point the buffer transitions into the replace state and begins outputting data.
The data consist of the byte values from the array beginning at position zero and
advancing one position per clock tick until the end of the array is reached. A counter
is used to index the array. Finally, a special status signal is raised high for one clock
cycle concurrently with the last byte in the array to notify the controller that it may
resume its normal output. At this time, the replacement buffer also returns to its
idle state.
5.2.3 Word Builder (Byte-to-Word Converter)
The word builder is the final component in the data path of the packet through the
hardware. The purpose of the word builder is to take bytes from the output process of
the controller and buffer them until four bytes are available for a 32-bit output from
the application. A counter keeps track of how many bytes have been seen. An enable
signal comes from the controller to notify the word builder of each incoming byte.
The first three bytes are buffered. When the fourth byte arrives it passes through and
combines with the first three bytes for a 32-bit output. An output enable signal to
the controller informs the controller that the 32 bits are valid for output. The world
builder also has a flush signal that comes from the controller. This signal is asserted
by the controller when the last byte in the packet is being sent to the word builder.
It informs the word builder that it should output however many bytes it may have
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buffered along with the incoming (last) byte. If there are not four bytes for output,
padding (a byte of zeros) is used to complete a 32-bit word. One last output from
the word builder tells the controller the number of valid bytes of data (non-padding)
that went out with the last word. This information is necessary for the controller to
successfully modify the byte-length field in the frame trailer.
5.2.4 Multiple Expression Search-and-Replace
Unlike the FPgrep module, the current design of the FPsed module only allows for one
search-and-replace operation per module. However, multiple search-and-replace op-
erations can be achieved by simply daisy-chaining FPsed modules together as shown
in Figure 5.7. Note that daisy-chaining the modules together gives priority to search-
and-replace operations that come first in the specification.
Specification:
s/a(ar)*l/ffppxx/g
Resulting Hardware Circuit:
aararl ffppxx fpx
s/a(ar)*l/ffppxx/g
Module Module
FPsed FPsed
s/f*p+x*/fpx/g
s/f*p+x*/fpx/g
Figure 5.7: Multiple search-and-replace modules
5.3 Results
Several versions of the content editor were synthesized with the protocol wrappers
into the RAD of the FPX. One module was designed to replace computer viruses as
they traversed across a streaming UDP-based Internet connection. Another module
was developed to remove profanity from packet payloads and was tested in the lab
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using a UDP-based chat client. A third module was developed to remove HTML
tags from text. An example of the transformation performed by the HTML filter is
shown in Figure 5.8.
The following sections describe the device utilization and estimated throughput
of the content-editing modules that implements the HTML filter on a Xilinx Virtex
XCV2000E-6 part.
<BODY><H1>sed,a stream editor</H1>
<H2>version 3.02, 28 June 1998</H2>
<ADDRESS>by Ken Pizzini</ADDRESS>
<P><P><HR><P><UL>
<LI><A NAME="TOC1"
HREF="sed_1.html#SEC1">Introduction</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC2"
HREF="sed_2.html#SEC2">Invocation</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC3" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC3">SED
Programs</A>
<UL>
<LI><A NAME="TOC4" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC4">Selecting
lines with SED</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC5" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC5">Overview of
regular expression syntax</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC6" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC6">Where SED
buffers data</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC7" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC7">Often used
commands</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC8" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC8">Less
frequently used commands</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC9" HREF="sed_3.html#SEC9">Commands
for die-hard SED programmers</A>
</UL>
<LI><A NAME="TOC10" HREF="sed_4.html#SEC10">Some
sample scripts</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC11" HREF="sed_5.html#SEC11">About the
(non-)limitations on line
length</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC12" HREF="sed_6.html#SEC12">Other
resources for learning about SED</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC13" HREF="sed_7.html#SEC13">Reporting
bugs</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC14" HREF="sed_8.html#SEC14">Concept
Index</A>
<LI><A NAME="TOC15" HREF="sed_9.html#SEC15">Command
and Option Index</A>
</UL><P><HR><P>
This document was generated on 28 October 1999
using the <A
HREF="http://wwwcn.cern.ch/dci/texi2html/">texi2html<
/A>
translator version 1.54.</P></BODY>
sed, a stream editor version 3.02, 28 June 1998
by Ken Pizzini
Introduction
Invocation
SED Programs
Selecting lines with SED
Overview of regular expression syntax
Where SED buffers data
Often used commands
Less frequently used commands
Commands for die-hard SED programmers
Some sample scripts
About the (non-)limitations on line length
Other resources for learning about SED
Reporting bugs
Concept Index
Command and Option Index
This document was generated on 28 October 1999
using the texi2html translator version 1.54.
FPsed
s/<[^>]*>//
Internet Packet Header Internet Packet Header
Figure 5.8: Example of FPsed used to strip HTML tags from a packet payload
5.3.1 Device Utilization
The utilization of FPGA resources for three different modules is shown in Tables 5.1,
5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.1 shows the device utilization for a module containing only the
Protocol Wrappers. These values represent the overhead of the packet processing
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done by the Protocol Wrappers. Table 5.2 details the device utilization for a single
content editor that implements the HTML filter along with the Protocol Wrappers.
Finally, Table 5.3 shows the device utilization for four parallel content editors with
the Protocol Wrappers. The chart in Figure 5.9 illustrates the relative sizes of each
of the modules.
Table 5.1: Device Utilization for Protocol Wrappers
Virtex XCV2000E Utilization
Resources Device Utilization Percentage
Logic Slices 2410 out of 19200 12%
Flip Flops 2870 out of 38400 7%
Block RAMs 19 out of 160 11%
External IOBs 142 out of 512 27%
Table 5.2: Device Utilization for FPsed Module with Single Content Editor
Virtex XCV2000E Utilization
Resources Device Utilization Percentage
Logic Slices 2922 out of 19200 15%
Flip Flops 3223 out of 38400 8%
Block RAMs 21 out of 160 13%
External IOBs 142 out of 512 27%
Table 5.3: Device Utilization for FPsed Module with Quad Content Editors
Virtex XCV2000E Utilization
Resources Device Utilization Percentage
Logic Slices 4131 out of 19200 21%
Flip Flops 4093 out of 38400 10%
Block RAMs 56 out of 160 35%
External IOBs 142 out of 512 27%
5.3.2 Throughput
A single content-editing RE module for the HTML filter was synthesized for the
Virtex XCV2000E-6 FPGA that implements the RAD on the FPX platform. The
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Figure 5.9: FPsed device utilization
FPGA was placed and routed using the Xilinx backend tools to run at 64 MHz. This
provides a throughput of 64 MHz × 8 bits = 512 Mbps.
An experiment was run to mimic FPsed’s functionality with software running
on four different computers. One computer, a dual Intel Pentium 3 operating at 1 GHz
running a Linux 2.2 kernel, achieved 13.7 Mbps when the sed program (version 3.02)
read data from disk. To ensure that disk I/O was not a bottleneck, the same program
was run completely from memory and achieved 32.72 Mbps. This is approximately
16x slower than the FPsed hardware. Another computer, an Alpha 21364 operating at
667 MHz running Linux kernel 2.4, was able to perform a search-and-replace operation
on data at 36 Mbps when the input was read from disk, and 50.4 Mbps when the
input was run completely from memory. On average, the fastest computers were 10x
slower than a single FPsed module. Throughput results for all four computers are
shown in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of hardware and software throughput
As with FPgrep, the throughput of the FPsed module can be further increased
by instantiating multiple content editors in parallel and dispatching incoming packets
to an available editor (see section 4.3). For instance, if the HTML filter uses four
parallel editors, then the throughput can increase four-fold to 2.048 Gbps. This gives
FPsed a 40x advantage over the software as shown in Figure 5.10.
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Chapter 6
Generating the Hardware
The FPgrep and FPsed modules were designed to be easily reconfigurable when new
search terms are desired. It is necessary to have certain components such as the
regular expression finite state automata and the replacement buffer generated because
no single finite state automaton can be used to search for every regular expression.
Also, no single replacement string is suitable for all applications. To accomplish this
task, a complete design flow was implemented using a combination of static VHDL
components and dynamic VHDL components that are generated according to a user
specification. The design flow is completely automated, starting with a list of regular
expressions and ending with a hardware bitstream being programmed into the RAD
of an FPX.
6.1 Hardware Generation Implementation Details
Generating the hardware for the FPgrep and FPsed modules is done using a series of
scripts. These scripts are accessible via a shell command line or an easy to use web
interface. The input specifications to the scripts are slightly different for FPgrep and
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FPsed. For FPgrep, the specification contains a list of regular expressions, each with
an identification number associated with it that is also programmed into the hardware.
The identification number is inserted into an alert packet when the regular expression
is matched. The syntax for FPgrep and an example of a single list entry can be seen
below:
syntax:
/expression/prop(id number)/
example of a virus scanner:
/V i(R|r)u(S|s)/prop(6)/
The input specification for FPsed is slightly different. It consists of a list of regular
expressions and their corresponding replacement strings. The syntax for FPsed and
a couple examples can be seen below:
syntax:
s/expression/replacementstring/
example of stripping out HTML tags:
s/ < [∧>]∗ > //
example of a profanity blocker:
s/(P |p)rofa(N |n)ity/ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ /
The complete process of generating hardware from the user specified regular expres-
sion to the resulting module can be seen in Figure 6.1 (note that dashed-line blocks
are for FPsed only).
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Figure 6.1: Hardware generation from specification to bitstream
6.1.1 Top Level Script: buildApp
The main structure of the device is generated by a script called buildApp. BuildApp
reads the list of regular expression and performs several functions. First, it runs a
script called createRegex to create a regular expression machine for each entry in the
list. For FPsed, it also runs a script called replaceBufGen to create a replacement
buffer for each entry in the list. Finally, buildApp generates a VHDL entity for the
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top-level design (regex app.vhd), which instantiates each of the previously generated
components and wires them together.
6.1.2 Create Regular Expression FSM: createRegex
The createRegex script is responsible for creating each regular expression state ma-
chine needed for the design. This script first creates an input file (jlex in) for JLex
to parse. Next, JLex parses this file creating a Java representation of the regular
expression state machine. Finally, createRegex calls another script called stateGen to
parse the Java file.
6.1.3 Convert Java FSM to VHDL: stateGen
The stateGen script takes in a JLex-created Java representation of a regular expres-
sion state machine. It parses this Java file and extracts the pertinent state machine
information, including state transition tables and accepting states. Using this infor-
mation, the stateGen script then creates a VHDL representation of the state machine.
For FPgrep, the identification number associated with each regular expression is also
included in the hardware. Separate state machines are created for each regular ex-
pression in the user specification that are called regex fsmi.vhd, where i indicates the
regular expression number.
6.1.4 Create Replacement Buffer: replaceBufGen
The replaceBufGen script creates a VHDL representation of a state machine that
controls the output of a replacement string for FPsed. Note that separate replacement
buffers are created for each regular expression in the user specification that are called
replace bufi.vhd, where i indicates the replacement number.
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6.1.5 Create Synthesis Script: makeProject
Each new user specification may have a different number of regular expression strings.
This creates different files each time a new module is generated. Because of this, the
synthesis scripts required to build the hardware need to be different for each generated
module. The makeProject script creates a .prj file which can be used to synthesize
and map each specification using the Synplicity [26] synthesis tools (regex app.prj ).
6.2 Web Interface
A PHP-based [28] web interface was created to simplify designing new modules (cur-
rently only supports FPgrep). The interface allows regular expressions to be added,
edited, or deleted from a list of available expressions. The expressions along with
the associated information is stored in a MySQL [17] database. A screenshot of the
interface is shown in Figure 6.2. From the web, an administrator can select any sub-
set of the available expressions to be programmed into the hardware. The resulting
module can be used for several applications such as virus protection, network security,
copyright enforcement, or spam filtering. For network security and spam filtering ap-
plications, the Internet address of a server is specified to determine where alert packets
should be delivered. For networks that contain multiple FPX devices, the FPX IP
address, the port, and the stack specifies which FPX should be reprogrammed.
For example, if the second and third boxes of Figure 6.2 are checked, then
the FPX will be programmed to scan for two regular expressions. First, it will
scan packets for the hex string “6C744E5076” which appears in a digital document
fingerprint. Additionally, it will scan packets for the regular expression “Do Not
(Distribute|Release)”. If a packet containing either of these regular expressions is
found, then an alert packet is sent to the server address 192.168.100.1. Once the
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Figure 6.2: Web interface for generating modules
“Build FPX” button is pressed, the design scripts proceed to synthesize, place and
route, and reprogram the FPX over the network. More details on the applications
listed in Figure 6.2 are discussed later in Chapter 7
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Chapter 7
Applications for Managing Digital
Content
A variety of applications have been developed using the FPgrep and FPsed hardware
modules in conjunction with a suite of software tools. The software tools include a
MySQL database, a Java-based server that communicates with the database, as well
as a Java-based (also ported to C#) agent that communicates with the server. Each
of these components will be further described with respect to each application in the
following sections.
7.1 Spam Filter
Over the past decade, spam has become a menace to anyone with an email account.
Recent surveys show that between 50% and 60% of all email is now spam [11]. In
order to identify and effectively eliminate spam, packet payloads need to be completely
examined for spam keywords.
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FPgrep offers the power and flexibility to search for a number of regular ex-
pressions representing spam keywords. By programming a list of spam keywords into
the FPgrep hardware module and placing the hardware upstream from a mail server
as shown in Figure 7.1, much of the spam can be eliminated. Valid packets are al-
lowed to pass through the FPgrep module and arrive at the mail server. However,
when packets containing targeted spam keywords are processed by the FPgrep mod-
ule, these offending packets can be dropped before reaching the mail server. FPgrep
also offers the ability to send an alert packet to the mail server (or some other log
server) to log the event. The format of this alert packet can be seen in section A.1 of
Appendix A.
FPgrep module
Mail Server
Mail arrives 
from Internet
Mail is 
processed in 
the FPX
Alert packet is sent 
to mail server to 
log event
Mail containing spam 
is dropped by FPgrep
Valid mail 
arrives at 
Mail Server
Figure 7.1: FPgrep used as a spam filter
7.2 Virus Protection
Besides spam, viruses have become not only an annoyance, but also a costly hazard
for businesses connected to the Internet. Figure 7.2 represents a typical network
layout that is unprotected from modern viruses. If Host C is infected with a virus,
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then all the shaded nodes in the network now become vulnerable. Notice that no
node on the network is safe.
Host EHost DHost CHost B
Dept E
University X
Location B
Dept D
Location A
Dept A Dept C
Dept B
Host A
Figure 7.2: Typical unprotected network
By placing a protective system such as FPgrep or FPsed into the network and pro-
gramming it to search for digital virus signatures, malicious viruses can be effectively
identified and quarantined before they are able to spread. Figure 7.3 depicts the
same network as in Figure 7.2. However, when the network is protected only a small
portion of the nodes on the network are now vulnerable.
The following sections describe two possible virus protection solutions that
can be offered via the FPgrep module: a passive approach and an active approach.
Both approaches are similar in that the FPgrep module is programmed to search for
digital signatures of some number of viruses. Each digital signature may consist of
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Figure 7.3: Network protected with FPgrep or FPsed
a hexadecimal string extracted from an executable virus, several lines of code from
a macro virus, or some other identifying characteristic of the virus. The passive and
active virus applications differ only in their behavior once a virus is detected.
7.2.1 Passive Virus
When running the passive virus application, the FPgrep module passively monitors
all traffic flowing through the network. This means that if a virus is detected by
the system, the virus is allowed to continue on to its destination. However, before
sending the offending packet, a UDP alert packet (see section A.1 of Appendix A) is
generated and sent to the same destination as the offending packet. A software agent
residing on the destination machine receives the alert packet and informs the user of
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the machine of the possible downloaded virus via a prompt similar to the one seen in
Figure 7.5. This sequence of events can be followed in Figure 7.4.
FPgrep module
Internet User
(1) Internet 
User requests 
content from 
Internet
(2) Content 
returns from 
Internet through 
FPX
(3) Content is 
processed in 
the FPX
(4) Alert packet is 
sent to user to warn 
them about the virus
(5) Content 
containing virus is 
forwarded from FPX
Figure 7.4: FPgrep used for passive virus protection
Figure 7.5: Alert message generated by agent software
7.2.2 Active Virus
The active virus application uses the FPgrep module to actively monitor all traffic
flowing through the network. This is different from the passive application because
now when a virus is detected in a packet, the packet is not allowed to continue on to
its destination. Instead, the virus is dropped by the FPgrep module, thereby protect-
ing the destination machine. However, just as in the passive application, the FPgrep
module generates a UDP alert packet and sends it to the destination machine where
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a software agent receives the packet and generates a screen prompt. The sequence of
events for the active virus application and the screen prompt can be seen in Figures
7.6 and 7.7.
FPgrep module
Internet User
(1) Internet 
User requests 
content from 
Internet
(2) Content 
returns from 
Internet through 
FPX
(3) Content is 
processed in 
the FPX
(5) Alert packet is 
sent to user to let 
them know about 
the virus
(4) Content 
containing virus is 
dropped at FPX
Figure 7.6: FPgrep used for active virus protection
Figure 7.7: Alert message generated by agent software
7.3 Information Security
Another important issue with respect to many corporate and medical networks has
to do with the security of the information on the network and the information that
is being accessed by machines on the network. It is crucial for both business and
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legal reasons that documents deemed to be internal documents stay internal to the
network, and information deemed to be a liability or unsuitable not be allowed onto
the network.
The first problem of maintaining internal documents can be easily accomplished
with the FPgrep module by embedding some digital signature or watermark into each
document, or by using some regular expression that is common to all internal doc-
uments such as “CONFIDENTIAL” or “Do Not (Distribute|Release)”. The FPgrep
hardware could then be programmed to search for this signature and drop all packets
containing the signature as they attempt to exit the network.
The second problem of disallowing certain information onto the network would
require an administrator to identify and create regular expressions for each piece of
information that was not allowed onto the network. This sounds like an arduous
task, but can be greatly simplified by finding commonalities between many pieces of
information and using one regular expression to search for all of them. For instance,
if administrators wanted to eliminate all traffic utilizing the KaZaA [21] peer-to-peer
software, they simply need to program the FPgrep module to search for the common
KaZaA application header. This would cause the FPgrep module to drop all KaZaA
packets thus rendering the software unusable.
Just as with the virus protection algorithm, the security application has both
an active mode that drops offending packets and a passive mode that allows offend-
ing packets to pass through (Figure 7.8). Whichever application is used, it is always
important that all network security breaches be reported to some administrator. Be-
cause of this, the FPgrep security application sends a UDP alert packet (see section
A.1 of Appendix A) to some predetermined administrative server whenever a match
is detected.
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The alert packet is received by a Java-based security application. The appli-
cation logs the source and destination IP addresses of the offending packet as well as
what information was matched in the packet. The security application also has the
ability to access the Property database table displayed in Figure 6.2 to retrieve the
information related to each property ID in the alert packet. This information consists
of a description along with a value for each expression found. The values for each
expression found can be accumulated to represent some priority level given to each
alert. An example prompt for a security breach can be seen in Figure 7.9.
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Figure 7.8: FPgrep used as a passive security application
Figure 7.9: Alert message generated by agent software
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7.4 Copyright Enforcement
The final application that was developed for the FPgrep module is a method to legit-
imize the distribution of copyrighted digital media such as music and movies. With
the widespread use of peer-to-peer networks such as KaZaA, Morpheus, BearShare
and others, the illegal distribution of digital music and movie files has had a tremen-
dous strain on their respective industries.
To alleviate this problem, a complete hardware/software solution has been de-
veloped including the FPgrep hardware, a software agent for the end systems, and a
transaction server (database tables for the transaction server can be seen in Appendix
B). Each software agent is registered to a specific user with the transaction server.
The transaction server keeps track of all registered agents, registered users, as well as
what content each user is authorized to download.
FPgrep module
Internet User
(1) Internet 
User requests 
content from 
Internet
(2) Content 
returns from 
Internet through 
FPX
(3) Content is 
processed in 
the FPX
(5) Alert packet is sent 
to user to determine 
Transaction Server 
info
(4) Flow containing 
copyrighted content 
is blocked at FPX
Transaction Server
DBase
Figure 7.10: FPgrep’s copyright enforcement application (1 of 6)
For this application the FPgrep module can be programmed to search for either
Digital Rights Management (DRM) tags, or just byte stings that occur in commonly
traded music and movie files. When a match is detected in a packet, the FPgrep
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module can prevent that packet along with all subsequent packets from reaching
the destination machine. Instead an alert packet (see section A.1) is sent to the
destination machine with information about what match or matches occurred in the
offending packet as shown in Figure 7.10.
When the alert packet arrives at the destination machine, the agent software
appends a user ID# and an agent ID# to the alert packet (see section A.2.1) and
forwards it to the transaction server. When the transaction server receives the packet,
it checks a Rights table in the database to see if the user is authorized to download
the content. If so, the transaction server sends a release packet (see section A.2.3) to
the FPgrep module allowing the blocked content to pass through. This is shown in
Figure 7.11.
FPgrep module
Internet User
DBase
(6) Alert message is 
forwarded to 
Transaction Server 
with User info
(7) If user owns rights to the 
content, then send message 
to FPX to release flow
(8) Content is 
released from 
FPX and sent 
to user
Transaction Server
Figure 7.11: FPgrep’s copyright enforcement application (2 of 6)
If the transaction server determines that the user is not authorized to down-
load the content, it will send a purchase request (see section A.2.2) to the user as
shown in Figure 7.12. The purchase request contains a textual description of the
content that was blocked by the FPgrep module as well as a cost for the content.
This enables a user to make an informative decision about purchasing the content.
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Once the purchase prompt arrives at the user’s machine, the agent software gener-
ates a screen prompt with all of this information giving the user a choice to purchase
or not to purchase the content. An example screen prompt can be seen in Figure 7.13.
FPgrep module
Internet User
DBase
(9) If user DOESN’T 
own rights to the 
content, then 
generate prompt to 
purchase
Transaction Server
Figure 7.12: FPgrep’s copyright enforcement application (3 of 6)
Figure 7.13: A prompt to purchase copyrighted content
Once the user make a decision, a response packet (see section A.2.1) is sent to
the transaction server. This is shown in Figure 7.14.
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FPgrep module
Internet User
DBase
(10) User selects 
“YES” or “NO” to 
purchase
Transaction Server
Figure 7.14: FPgrep’s copyright enforcement application (4 of 6)
In the event that a user selects YES and decides to purchase the copyrighted
content, several events follow. First, the transaction server makes an entry in the
Rights table so that subsequent downloads of the same content are allowed to pass
through the FPgrep module. At this point the transaction server can also debit a
user account for the purchase. Next, the transaction server sends a release packet (see
section A.2.3) to the FPgrep module allowing the blocked content to pass through.
Finally, the transaction server also sends a receipt packet (see section A.2.4) to the
user to let them know that their account has been debited. The receipt packet
contains information about how much the user’s account was debited and creates a
screen prompt similar to the prompt in Figure 7.15. This whole sequence of events is
shown in Figure 7.16.
Figure 7.15: A receipt prompt for copyrighted content
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Figure 7.16: FPgrep’s copyright enforcement application (5 of 6)
If the user decides that they are not interested in downloading the copyrighted
content and selects NO when presented with the option, the transaction server simply
sends a drop packet (see section A.2.3) to the FPgrep module. This packet tells the
module that it should stop buffering data associated with the copyrighted content
and just drop all the data. This can be seen in Figure 7.17.
FPgrep module
Internet User
DBase
(15) If user selects “NO”, 
then send message to FPX 
to terminate flow
Transaction Server
Figure 7.17: FPgrep’s copyright enforcement application (6 of 6)
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Chapter 8
Summary and Future Work
8.1 Summary
In this thesis two hardware modules, FPgrep and FPsed, have been presented that
were designed to help manage the distribution of digital content.
The FPgrep module is capable of passively scanning packet payloads for a
set of regular expressions, actively dropping packets that match any of the regular
expressions, and generating alert packets to notify administrators of any match that
occurs. The module was implemented on the FPX and tested using real TCP/IP
Internet traffic on both the WUGS and in a stand-alone configuration. FPgrep is
capable of operating at speeds of 1.184 Gbps for twenty-one ∼20 character regular
expressions, and exceeding speeds of 2.5 Gbps for smaller numbers of similar regular
expressions.
The FPsed module is capable of scanning packet payloads for a set of regular
expressions and actively replacing any occurrence of a match. The module was im-
plemented on the FPX and tested using a UDP-based chat client over the Internet.
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The hardware solution was found to be about 60 times faster than similar software
solutions when using parallel modules.
A simplified design flow was implemented for both modules. The design flow
accepts user input in common regular expression syntax, generates the necessary
VHDL, places and routes the design, and even programs the FPGA with the new
bitstream. The design flow can be accessed through either command lines tools or
through a web interface.
Finally, several applications were developed to utilize the capabilities of the FP-
grep and FPsed modules. These include a spam filter, a virus protection application,
an information security application, as well as a copyright enforcement application.
8.2 Future Work
8.2.1 FPgrep
Currently, the bottleneck in the FPgrep module is the fanout associated with sending
8-bits of data to all of the parallel DFAs. To improve the timing, a tree structure of
flip-flops (as described and implemented in [7]) can be used to distribute the data to
all of the DFAs to minimize the propagation delay.
The content scanner is designed to support several different behaviors as de-
scribed in Chapter 4. However, the behaviors such as sending an alert message are not
specified on an expression-by-expression basis. For example, if the content scanner
is compiled to send an alert packet, it will send that alert packet for all the regular
expressions in the module. It is more desirable to have the action rules based on
which expression matched. Doing this would allow alert packets to be sent for some
regular expressions in the module and not for others. An enhanced version of awk’s
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pattern-rule syntax [25] (but with reduced instruction set) has been defined which is
suitable for this task.
Finally, the content scanner currently looks for matches on a packet-by-packet
basis. This means that if a string that should cause a match spans multiple packets,
it will be missed by the content scanner. This behavior may be improved by utilizing
the TCP-Splitter [19, 20] to process data on a stream-by-stream basis. This entails
augmenting the content scanner to a multi-context design that maintains a match
context for each available flow and switches contexts based on the stream that is
currently being presented by the TCP-Splitter.
8.2.2 FPsed
Currently, the FPsed module does not search for multiple regular expressions in the
same fashion as the FPgrep module. Each FPgrep module is capable of using parallel
DFAs and searching for multiple regular expressions. In contrast, each FPsed module
only searches for a single regular expression. FPsed modules are daisy-chained to-
gether when searching for more than one regular expression. This not only wastes the
limited resources of the FPGA, but it also adds a great deal of latency. Future ver-
sions of the FPsed module will employ an architecture similar to that of the FPgrep
module.
The idea of doing search-and-replace on TCP/IP streams is also something that
has been considered. Preliminary plans for accomplishing this have been discussed.
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Appendix A
Application Packet Formats
A.1 Common Packet Formats for All Applications
A.1.1 Alert Packet Format
Packet Type
Source IP
Dest. IP
FPX IP Addr
Packet Ref.
Property IDs
…
• Packet Type:
– byte 0:
∗ opcode = 0x00 (Information Security)
∗ opcode = 0x01 (Passive Virus Protection)
∗ opcode = 0x02 (Active Virus Protection)
∗ opcode = 0x03 (Copyright Enforcement)
∗ opcode = 0x04 (Spam Filter)
– byte 1-3: unused
• Source IP address of packet that caused this alert packet
• Destination IP address of packet that caused this alert packet
to be generated
• FPX IP address is the address of the FPX device that found
the match and generated this alert packet
• Packet Reference ID# is a 32-bit identifier used by the hard-
ware to identify this alert packet
• Property IDs is a list of 32-bit integers that identifies which
content matched in the original packet
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A.2 Other Copyright Enforcement Application
Packet Formats
A.2.1 Forwarded Alert Packet and Purchase Prompt
Response Formats
Packet Type
Source IP
Dest. IP
FPX IP Addr
Packet Ref.
Property IDs
…
Delimiter
User ID#
Agent ID#
• Packet Type:
– Forwarded Alert Packet
∗ byte 0: opcode = 0x03
∗ byte 1-3: unused
– Purchase Prompt Response
∗ byte 0:
· opcode = 0x16 if user selects YES
· opcode = 0x18 if user selects NO
∗ byte 1-3: unused
• Source IP address of packet that caused this alert packet to be
generated
• Destination IP address of packet that caused this alert packet
to be generated
• FPX IP address is the address of the FPX device that found
the match and generated this alert packet
• Packet Reference ID# is a 32-bit identifier used by the hard-
ware to identify this alert packet
• Property IDs is a list of 32-bit integers that identifies which
content matched in the original packet
• The Delimiter is used to separate the User ID# from the Prop-
erty IDs. This delimiter is 32-bits of zeros. (NOTE: This
means that when assigning property IDs, the database must
begin at 1 instead of 0 to prevent confusion).
• The User ID# is a 32-bit number that identifies each user that
has registered with the system
• The Agent ID# is a 32-bit number that identifies an Agent
that has been registered with the system.
69
A.2.2 Purchase Prompt Request Format
Packet Type
Source IP
Dest. IP
FPX IP Addr
Packet Ref.
Property IDs
…
Property
Descriptions
Delimiter
• Packet Type:
– byte 0: opcode = 0x10
– byte 1-3: a representation of the value of the sum of all
property IDs the user doesn’t currently have rights to
download
• Source IP address of packet that caused this alert packet to be
generated
• Destination IP address of packet that caused this alert packet
to be generated
• FPX IP address is the address of the FPX device that found
the match and generated this alert packet
• Packet Reference ID# is a 32-bit identifier used by the hard-
ware to identify this alert packet
• Property IDs is a list of 32-bit integers that identifies which
content matched in the original packet
• The Delimiter is used to separate the Property Descriptions
from the Property IDs. This delimiter is 32-bits of zeros.
(NOTE: This means that when assigning property IDs, the
database must begin at 1 instead of 0 to prevent confusion).
• Property Description is a string which identifies to the user
what was matched by the hardware.
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A.2.3 Release and Drop Packet Formats
Packet Type
Packet Ref.
• Packet Type:
– Release Packet
∗ byte 0: opcode = 0x12
∗ byte 1-3: unused
– Drop Packet
∗ byte 0: opcode = 0x14
∗ byte 1-3: unused
• Packet Reference ID# is a 32-bit identifier used by the hard-
ware to identify this alert packet
A.2.4 Receipt and Not Registered Packet Formats
• Packet Type:
– Receipt Packet
∗ byte 0: opcode = 0x22
∗ byte 1-3: unused
– Not Registered Packet
∗ byte 0: opcode = 0x21
∗ byte 1-3: unused
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Appendix B
Database Tables
This appendix describes the MySQL tables that are used for the applications de-
scribed in Chapter 7 as well as the table described in section 6.2 that is used with
the web interface.
Property Table (used with web interface)
+---------------+--------------+------+-----+---------+----------------+
| Field | Type | Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+---------------+--------------+------+-----+---------+----------------+
| id | int(11) | | PRI | NULL | auto_increment |
| search_string | varchar(50) | | | | |
| description | varchar(30) | | | | |
| owners_id | int(11) | | | 0 | |
| value | decimal(9,2) | | | 0.00 | |
+---------------+--------------+------+-----+---------+----------------+
Agents Table
+----------+---------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field | Type | Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+----------+---------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| users_id | int(11) | | | 0 | |
| agent_id | int(11) | | | 0 | |
+----------+---------+------+-----+---------+-------+
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Owners Table
+-------+-------------+------+-----+---------+----------------+
| Field | Type | Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+-------+-------------+------+-----+---------+----------------+
| id | int(11) | | PRI | NULL | auto_increment |
| name | varchar(30) | | | | |
+-------+-------------+------+-----+---------+----------------+
Rights Table
+---------------+---------+------+-----+------------+----------------+
| Field | Type | Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+---------------+---------+------+-----+------------+----------------+
| invoice_num | int(11) | | PRI | NULL | auto_increment |
| users_id | int(11) | | | 0 | |
| property_id | int(11) | | | 0 | |
| purchase_date | date | | | 0000-00-00 | |
+---------------+---------+------+-----+------------+----------------+
Users Table
+--------------+--------------+------+-----+------------+----------------+
| Field | Type | Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+--------------+--------------+------+-----+------------+----------------+
| id | int(11) | | PRI | NULL | auto_increment |
| login | varchar(16) | | | | |
| password | varchar(16) | | | | |
| name | varchar(30) | | | | |
| address | varchar(30) | | | | |
| city | varchar(30) | | | | |
| state | char(2) | | | | |
| zip | varchar(5) | | | | |
| credit_card | varchar(16) | | | | |
| exp_date | date | | | 0000-00-00 | |
| account_bal | decimal(9,2) | | | 0.00 | |
+--------------+--------------+------+-----+------------+----------------+
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